Illicit Arms Trade

The effect of technology on war and security has been proved on numerous occasions.  The inevitable dissemination of technology has added to apprehensions regarding the likelihood of technology getting to reckless hands. Technology control administrations have developed a dynamicelement of national security approaches for regulating proliferation and rebuffing technological gains to adversaries (Marsh & McDougal, 2020). Imminentdisputes to control of weapons and non-proliferation may require wider collaboration amongst theprogressivelydependentcountries. Based on illicit arms trade, both Victor Bout and A.Q. Khan were firearms, WMD, and dual-use machineries, supplying offenders, extremists, warlords, and nation-states with these weapons and capabilities.The essay seeks to assess the socio political environment that facilitated illicit arms trade by Victor Bout and A.Q. Khan and two prospective resolutions for averting the future production of weapons, WMD, or dual-use machineries.

Socio-political Environment

Illicit weapons systemsoccur for palpable reasons. Sinceworldwide markets for armaments do not function freely, but are inhibited by nations’ foreign policies and regulations, most of the demand for armaments is met by means further than the states’ reach. Black and grey markets, for weaponries or anything else, develop when supply and demand are adequate to withstandlucrative exchange amongst an assortment of actors notwithstanding the threats.As in authorized markets, exchanges will happen, when the cost of participating in the prohibited market are offset by the net gains from the interchange. Nonetheless, the transaction expenseslinked to illegal market exchange are unvaryinglycomplexcompared toauthorized markets. Even though anyone conversant with legal weaponriespurchasingmay be aware that it only indefinitelylook like an authentic market.There exists a premium on data regarding accessibility, price, quality, and additional matters when goods should be transacted out of sight since their interchange runs counter to strategy or is banned by laws. Similarly, the costs of negotiating and sustaining contracts are greater since dealings are extra-legal. This is therefore precarious; the parties to the interchange may not turn to the country’s experts for intention of imposing property privileges and terms of the contracts.

Though it is indeed the case that administrations and weapons firms are occasionallyconsidered amongstthe actors that participate in illegaldealings, this is frequently attributed to rogue persons or units within the organizations. Officialadministrative and business establishmentsdesigned as chain of commandare not very well matched to accomplish the competencesessential to equipoise the added transaction expenseslinked with interchange in illicit markets (Shelley, 2014). This is attributed to grave assessments of the public policies and laws, which is denunciation to the operations within theprohibited markets. Less officialadministrations with core-periphery or cell network systems are wellcapable ofaverting this kind of analysis and to acclimatize when their illegitimatedealings are, or mightturn out to be, uncovered. Therefore, the illicit arms and proliferation networks adopt these types of structures.

Two Prospective Solutions

 

One of the two prospective solutions includes raising awareness. This involves raising awareness on the devastating effect of the proliferation of the weaponries on the lives and livelihoods of individuals globally. This includes nations that are may not be entangled in conflicts. It is important for numerous states to strengthen the lawful and administrative structureto battle and avert the illegal flow of these classifications of armaments across their borders. United Nations member countries now recognize the significance of attempts to battle the prohibitedmovement of SALW, and initiate the integration such attempts into broader national growth planning credentials. Member Countries that include CARICOM Member Statesshould initiate the implementationof the highest inter- national principles for storing and safe discarding of SALW.

The second prospective solution building on this structure to realize more palpable, computable welfares. Member States should start demonstrating the political will to handle apparently taboo matters, for instance, ammo and trading across borders. The United Nations and the international community of non-governmental establishmentsmust continue playinga critical role by guaranteeing that there is sufficientstudy to help Member States in holdingaccurate, evidence-based deliberations on thesubjects. Thereshould similarly be a significantinterchange of data and partaking in best undertakings at the state-to-state and region-to- region levels (Duquet & Goris, 2018). This willcompel individual Member States to guarantee that programmes and strategies that are developed are ahead of the curvature, and to project the recurrence of the let-downs and hindrancespreviouslyundergone by others.

Conclusion

Thanks to the diffusion of technology, the universe today is mutually dependent and co-operative. This has generated an unparalleled recognition of the prerequisite to collaborate for enhanced constancy and harmony in the world, with an emphasis on reducing vehemence and uncertainty. Conversely, increased data may feed suspicions and opinions of coercions, while the instantaneous media reporting of the most important events are likely to create sharper responses and extra stresses for action.  The renunciation of genuine requirements for high-value technology is likely to increase strains and create avoidable hostility. The future challenges may entail knowing how to manage technology to guarantee universal economic development, while similarlyshielding technologies from misappropriation so that local and world-wide security and stability apprehensions are not compromised. Generally, public awareness is seen to increase—for better or for worse.

 

 

References

Duquet, N. & Goris, K. (2018). Chapter 3: Terrorist Access to Firearms. In Firearms Acquisition by Terrorists in Europe. Project SAFTE.

Marsh, N. J., & McDougal, T. L. (2020). Illicit small arms prices: Introducing two new datasets. Defence and Peace Economics, 1-22.

Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. ISBN-13: 978-1107689305 Thachuk, K. & Lal, R. (2018). Terrorist Criminal Enterprises: Financing Terrorism through Organized Crime. Prager. ISBN-13: 978-1440860676 http://jjay.textbookx.com/institutional/index.php?action=browse#books/2696710

 

Solution:

Looking for help with your homework?
Grab a 30% Discount and Get your paper done!

30% OFF
Turnitin Report
Formatting
Title Page
Citation
Place an Order

Cite this Page

Illicit Arms Trade . (2021, November 10). The Studypool . Retrieved July 19, 2024, from https://www.thestudypool.com/samples/illicit-arms-trade/
“ Illicit Arms Trade .” The Studypool , 10 Nov. 2021, www.thestudypool.com/samples/illicit-arms-trade/
Illicit Arms Trade . [online]. Available at: <https://www.thestudypool.com/samples/illicit-arms-trade/> [Accessed 19 Jul. 2024].
Illicit Arms Trade [Internet]. The Studypool . 2021 Nov 10 [cited 2024 Jul 19]. Available from: https://www.thestudypool.com/samples/illicit-arms-trade/
copy
Grab A 14% Discount on This Paper
Pages (550 words)
Approximate price: -